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The Electronic Journal of the Berglund Center for Internet Studies
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.01. Introduction (Return to Index)
This editorial is the second in a series of analyses on the linked topics of the Internet and
globalism. [1] In the foregoing piece, we argued that the Internet and globalism are closely related
in their development, key factors in defining the era in which we live. One consequence of the
growth of the Internet is the development of a global civic culture. But economic globalism does
not require the Internet in its present form, and it is possible that we will have economic
globalism, but not cultural globalism. In this piece we wish to discuss the emerging global civic
culture as it relates to the power of the American state and the future of the country.
We focus here on an important and timely issue, the power of the state, and particularly of the
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American state, in the age of the Internet. We argue throughout this series of editorial essays
that the events of September 11, 2002, can be understood to a considerable degree as the
result of the impact of the Internet.
In preparing this argument, we have found very useful a recent work, Joseph S. Nye Jr’s The
Paradox of American Power. [2] Nye is a considerable figure, even in the talented ranks of
American scholar-bureaucrats, ranks that include such figures as George Kennan and Henry
Kissinger. He is a former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and was Assistant
Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration. He is currently Dean of Harvard University’s
Kennedy School of Government. He has written a number of influential works in addition to this
latest one. [3]
Nye’s analysis of globalization and of the origins and consequences of the Internet, though
considered from the primary focal point of U.S. policy rather than from the focal point of the
impact of the Internet itself, as we approached it in a previous essay, is roughly congruent with
our foregoing analysis. Where Nye adds considerable value, however, is in spelling out the impact
of the Internet upon American power.
.02. “Hard Power” (Return to Index)
Nye is, of course, as a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, well acquainted with what he
terms “hard power”, i.e., the traditional elements of state power such as military force and
economic influence. He states that: “Military power and economic power are both examples of
hard command power that can be used to induce others to change their position.” [4] In short,
“hard power” flows largely from economic and military strength and is at least implicitly coercive.
.03. “Soft” Power (Return to Index)
But Nye goes on to define an additional type of power, “soft power”:
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want
to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and
openness. In this sense it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract
others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic
weapons. This aspect of power—getting others to want what you want—I call soft power. [5]
American hard power is different from that of the country in previous eras, or from that of
previous great powers only in degree: recent conflicts such as Desert Storm, the war in Kosovo
or the Afghani campaign show an unparalleled blend of fire power and technological
sophistication, an ability to so dominate the “battle space” as to make war appear almost
effortless, as well as largely bloodless, at least for American forces.
.04. The Origins of Soft Power (Return to Index)
However, American soft power, Nye argues, is quantitatively and qualitatively different from earlier
American power, or from that of previous great powers. American values and institutions are
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being projected world wide, largely as a consequence of the related phenomenon of globalization
and what Nye terms “the global information age.” [6] As we argued earlier, neither of these can
be disentangled from the growth of the Internet itself.
While soft power greatly benefits the United States in that it tends to make others emulate
Americans, and thus to want what they want, it is not, unlike military power, a deliberate
consequence of policy. Rather, soft power flows from a number of extra-governmental sources
such as popular culture, from the exemplary power of legal and political institutions, from U.S.-
based human rights groups, even from groups such as the anti-W.T.O. protestors, who, even
while attacking the system, disseminate widely held American values. Nye refers to this process
as “social globalization,” and also sees an “incipient… civil society at the global level.” [7] This
corresponds to what we earlier termed “Global Civic Culture.”
Much of Nye’s analysis is intended to make a relatively simple point: That the United States is
indefinitely unchallengeable in terms of its “hard power”; but “soft power” is growing steadily more
important in a networked world, and is the more frangible of American sources of power. There
will be a natural process that somewhat vitiates the impact of American soft power in any event
as other information economies mature. For example, by 2010, Nye argues, there will be more
Chinese Internet users than American ones. [8] While American sites will remain very attractive,
because of the fact that English has become the world’s second language, China too sits at the
center of a linguistic empire that not only embraces the worldwide Diaspora of Chinese people,
but has also in the past embraced much of East Asia including Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and
other nations.
.05. A Dichotomy or a Transition? (Return to Index)
Nye’s position intersects at several points with the analysis of Manuel Castells, sociologist and the
author of the encyclopedic multi-volume work,The Information Age: Economy, Society, and
Culture. [9]
Nye’s argument follows in time upon that of Castells in that Castells wrote in 1996, Nye after
September 11, 2002. But Nye’s position is ultimately grounded in an earlier tradition of “realist”
definitions of power:
Power used to be in the hands of princes, oligarchies, and ruling elites; it was defined as the
capacity to impose one’s will on others. Modifying their behavior. This image of power does
not fit with our reality any longer [10]…
Castells spends far more time than does Nye considering the “Information Age.” In doing so, he
perhaps has the advantage in contextualizing American power. His argument is also far more
dynamic. To Castells, the Information Age is an ongoing process, which he considers from a
number of perspectives.
Nye believes that there are two dichotomous kinds of power: “hard” and “soft”. For Castells,
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there are not two kinds of power, but a still incomplete transition from one kind of power to
another.
For Castells, power is being permanently transformed; Nye’s hard power is eroding: states, even
the most powerful one, the United States, now live in an environment marked by a decentralized
net of “local terror equilibria.” 11In the past, during the Cold War, several major states and their
allies established an equilibrium based upon mutual assured destruction; this prevented any one
power from dominating the global political or economic system, but it also protected each of the
major states from the others. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States then
enjoyed a brief period of near absolute dominance.
.06. American Power Following 9-11 (Return to Index)
But global processes had already distributed a variety of weapons of mass destruction among
major and minor powers, and more importantly, among non-state actors as well. September 11,
2002, revealed the vulnerabilities of even the greatest of powers to non-state actors. The
devastating effect of the low-cost and relatively simple improvised weapons that were used then
suddenly illuminated a terrible new world.
The use of a bacteriological weapon, Anthrax, then followed quickly upon the trauma of 9-11—so
quickly that historians may well treat the two events as one. This attack revealed an additional
and, to many, even more terrifying vulnerability and again showed the new power of non-state
actors.
Castells refers to these sorts of weapons, including chemical and biological ones, as well as the
feared low-yield “dirty” nuclear devices sometimes referred to as “suitcase bombs” as “veto
technologies” and presumes that this new decentralized web of great and small states and non-
state actors will require constant small interventions by many different powers to maintain a
relative peace. This seems to be an apt description of events since September 11 as a variety of
alliances, states, and international organizations have joined the campaign against terrorism.
There are, then, many indications that Castells is, to a considerable degree at least, correct in his
analysis of state power in the Information Age, and Nye wrong. State power is evolving toward a
decentralized fabric, like all else in the Information Age.
.07. The Limitations of the Networked International System (Return to Index)
There are also many indications that some in the American policy-making institutions understand
the implications of a world like that described by Castells. Recently (March, 2002), the Pentagon
report “The Nuclear Posture Review” discussed conditions under which the United States might
use nuclear weapons. This analysis immediately attracted a great deal of attention because it
suggested the first-strike employment of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers. Since
the end of World War II such use has been presumed to be outside the parameters of civilized
warfare, and particularly outside American nuclear doctrine. But times have changed.
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As stated by one reporter, Michael Gordon, “Another theme in the report is the possible use of
nuclear weapons to destroy enemy stocks of biological weapons, chemical arms and other arms
of mass destruction.” [12] These are, of course, precisely the “veto technologies” listed by
Castells. [13]
The limitation in the current international system is probably most critically, from an American
point of view, that it tends to restrain unilateral American action. As a result, great attention
necessarily must be paid to alliances and coalition building. But if anything terrifies the
international community it is the specter of nuclear war, or the possibility of a return to a Cold
War system with its attendant enormous expenses and the inherent threat of destruction.
.08. The Nuclear Posture Review (Return to Index)
The “Nuclear Posture Review” represents the Bush administration’s attempt to break the bonds
that presently restrains American power: first-strike use of nuclear weapons effectively removes
the need to consult allies. It amounts to an attempt to restore the brief period of absolute
domination (and absolute security) enjoyed by the U.S. following the fall of the Soviet Union,
before we had become aware of the terrible new forces that could be employed by “rogue
states” and criminal organizations such as Al Quaeda.
If the United States were to be successful in putting the terrorist genie back in the bottle by
threatening nuclear strikes on states that both harbor terrorists and possess weapons of mass
destruction, including most especially chemical and bacteriological ones, then Nye is, perhaps,
correct: There are two sorts of power and the United States can continue to enjoy a near
monopoly of classical “hard” power.
But Nye, like Castells, recognizes that “under the influence of the information revolution and
globalization, world politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all of their
international goals acting alone.” [14] The uproar, both domestic and international over the
implications of the “Nuclear Policy Review” is evidence of the essential accuracy of Castell’s
analysis. [15] Once again, the United States has discovered the limits of state autonomy in a
networked system.
.09. Additional Causes of the Loss of State Power (Return to Index)
In Addition, Castells’ broader analysis of the Information Age lets us see a number of other
factors critical to state power. Castells demonstrates, we think, that the power of all states,
including the American state, is being irreversibly eroded, not by enemies who can be confronted
with nuclear weapons, but by historical processes, most especially by globalization and the
development of the Internet.
This is not to agree with the claims of some that the state is in any sense disappearing.
Libertarian dreams of replacing the state by infallibly just and accurate market forces are just
that, dreams. But the role of the state, like all else, must yield before the impact of globalization
and the development of the Internet. Exactly how it changes is not important to our analysis in
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this stage; it is a topic to which we will return in the future.
Above all, the state is losing power in the face of globalized economic processes facilitated by
networked means of communication. Globalization has raised capital flows to the level of hazard
earlier represented only by catastrophic forces of nature. Portuguese state power was destroyed
by the earthquake at Lisbon in 1755, effectively ending the great era of Portuguese exploration
and expansion. And Portugal was, of course, one of the first powerful states. But capital flows
struck with far more devastating effect the economies of Korea, Thailand, Japan, and many
other states in the late twentieth century. As long as states are dependant upon an interlocked
world economy, no nation can long act independently.
.10. The Link Between States and Their Citizens Weakens (Return to Index)
Castells raises additional relevant factors. He believes that the essential element of state influence
in the 20th century has been its bottom-line welfare functions. When all else fails individual
citizens, it has been the industrial state that has provided a social safety net. But globalization
and the networking of production effectively cause states to continually reduce welfare expenses.
In the struggle for markets, it is the system with the leanest cost structure that wins.
There are now no remaining great power welfare states. This not only weakens individual ties to
the state, but also causes many to perceive that it is the state itself, by entering into agreements
such as NAFTA and the WTO, that is responsible for their plight.
In an effort to regain citizen loyalty, many states, including those as disparate as the United
States and the Peoples Republic of China, have chosen to decentralize budgetary and control
processes to ever lower administrative levels. Paradoxically, this further reduces the power of the
state, and attenuates loyalty to it. Furthermore, this tendency is further enhanced by another
characteristic of the Internet: the continual creation of micro-communities of interest that
increasingly command the loyalty of individuals.
Even internal political institutions are deeply affected by globalization and the Informational
Society. The political party structures in each of the major states have been simultaneously
weakening. This process is furthest advanced, of course, in the United States, where the
Informational Society itself is the most advanced. There are probably many factors that contribute
to this development, many of which are related to either globalization or the Internet. The
increasing inability of the state to disburse welfare funds clearly weakens many political machines.
But it is probably the Information Society itself that is primarily responsible. [16] Once again
Castells coins an apt term with which to explain these events: “informational politics.” [17] Simply
put, electronic media have displaced print media as the space in which politics is discussed. This
implies the same collapse of time and broadening of impact that characterizes electronic media
in general. In addition, the contest for audience attention continually drives the media to seek
broader and broader audiences with the resultant reluctance to deal with any issues, particularly
controversial ones, in detail or over an extended period of time lest the audience move on to
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more diverting sources of infotainment. Because politics now exist largely in media space,
appearance has become more important than substance. And citizens defect from the political
process as essentially misleading or corrupt.
Another consequence of political action being conducted in media space is the development of a
tendency to attribute complex events to colorful attention-grabbing individuals who can seize
media attention. This means that a worldwide Islamicist reaction to globalization and the Internet
is reduced to the single figure of Ibn Bin Laden. This process, of course, empowers charismatic
and ultimately simplistic individuals who can reduce complex issues to quickly transmitted
symbolic explanations.
.11. How Might the State Respond? (Return to Index)
The problems of the American state in the Informational Age recently have been greatly
ameliorated by the simple fact that the American people have come under attack. This has
silenced critics of the state ranging from parties out of power to even local anti-state groups such
as Citizen Militias.
This problem is only temporarily solved, of course, by such expedients as mounting a war against
enemies. However, it may be that a war against terrorism that goes on indefinitely and
continually expands will put the continuing decline of the state at bay, perhaps also indefinitely. It
may ultimately, however, also exacerbate the decline if state responses are eventually seen once
again as costly, misguided, and counter-productive. [18]
We have argued here that state responses that are not directed at the actual sources of
individual problems risk being ineffective, or at best will not be both efficient and maximally
effective. However, a state such as the United States is an extremely powerful organism and
may well solve many of its problems simply by profligate expenditures of economic and military
power. But if the nature of such problems as the terrorist attack of September 11, 2002, and the
diminishing claims of all states to citizen loyalty are indeed in some considerable part a
consequence of those changes we encapsulate here as globalization and the networked society,
then the attempts to ameliorate the results of these changes properly should be directed at the
causes themselves. In the next editorial, we wish to examine some possible responses, and to
assess their possible impact on the Internet.
.12. NOTES (Return to Index)
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18. It seems to me that the ultimate weakness of this strategy is that it requires attacks not
against decentralized networks, but against states. The link between Al Quaeda and
Afghanistan, as one example, may seem sufficiently direct to most individuals and most states to
compel support. But the less direct the apparent tie, the less compelling the case. An attack
against Iraq may even be satisfactory, to many Americans at least, in that Iraq is, in some sense,
a historic enemy. But the more distant the tie between other states and terrorists, the less
compelling the cause. Ultimately this strategy risks being judged as motivated by factors other
than reducing the threat of terrorism. Domestically it may be seen as linked to domestic political
goals; internationally it may be seen as linked to American attempts to achieve economic and
political advantages.
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Please note: After a given period of time, The New York Times, frequentlly cited here, moves its
articles into archives requiring paid access. As an historian, I regret the need to cite sources the
value of which is time bound, but see no alternatives. At worst, however, these articles are
available in the collections of large libraries, as they have always been.
Barlow, Jeffrey G. “Globalism and the Internet” see The Journal of Education, Community, and
Values: Interface on the Internet, February
2002. http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2002/01/editorial01.php
Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Bush Expands Commitment of U.S. to Global War on Terror” The New York
Times, March 11, 2002.http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/11/politics/11CND-
PREX.html Accessed 03/11/02.
Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd. Second
Edition, 2000. Vol. I of The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture and The Power of
Identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd. 1997. Vol. II of The Information Age: Economy,
Society, and Culture
Gordon, Michael R. “U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and New Targets.” The New York
Times, March 10, 2002.http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/10/international/10NUKE.html,
Accessed 03.11.02
Kozak, Jan T. Institute of Rock Mechanics, Czech Academy of Science and Charles D. James,
National Information Service for Earthquake Engineering “Historical Depictions of the 1755 Lisbon
Earthquake” National Information Service for Earthquake Engineering, University of California,
Berkeley.http://nisee.berkeley.edu/lisbon/ Accessed 03/11/02.
Nye, Joseph. Nye’s home page at Harvard:http://ksgfaculty.harvard.edu/Joseph_Nye
Nye, Joseph S, Jr. The Paradox of American Power, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
6/23/2014 American Power, Globalism, and the Internet: Editorial Essay | Interface
http://bcis.pacificu.edu/interface/?p=2352 10/10
Schmitt, Eric. “U.S. Tries to Dampen Fear Abroad on Policy.” The New York Times, March 11,
2002.http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/11/international/11REAC.html Accessed March 12, 2002
Wheeler, Deborah. “Islam, Community, and the Internet.” The Journal of Education, Community,
and Values: Interface on the Internet, March
2002.http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2002/03/islam.php
 
This entry was posted in Uncategorized by Editor. Bookmark the permalink
[http://bcis.pacificu.edu/interface/?p=2352] .
